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Merck v. Integra:  
Bailing Water Without Plugging the Hole 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pauline Newman Professor of Law at New 
York University School of Law, began working as a bench chemist for a 
pharmaceutical company in the late 1970s, there was a vigorous, free 
exchange of ideas, experimental results, and even novel chemical 
compounds between academia and industry.1 This exchange was based 
on the Mertonian ethos, and free access to scientific advances through 
the public domain was the norm.2 In essence, islands of private patent 
rights floated in a sea of pro-competitive public domain and, by default, 
scientific discoveries were part of that public domain.3
A very different world confronts researchers today. Universities seek 
and profit greatly from patents, which would have been unthinkable 
thirty years ago.4 Pharmaceutical companies are now reluctant to share 
discoveries and information with universities because these are viewed 
as direct competitors. The vigorous public sphere of science has 
substantially eroded. The paradigm has radically shifted such that islands 
of public domain float about in a vast sea of anti-competitive patent 
rights.5 Intellectual property is now the default. 
As part of what will be shown to be a limited move back towards the 
previously prevailing competitive baseline, Merck v. Integra6 served to 
affirm an expansive reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor created in the 
1984 Hatch-Waxman Act.7 In its unanimous decision penned by Justice 
  1.Rochelle Dreyfuss, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment: Protecting the 
Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 
457, 458 (Fall 2004) (explored in detail in PART V, infra). 
 2. Id. at 464. 
 3. Id. at 465. This paradigm squares well with the strong presumption against the validity of 
monopolies that tempered the creation of the patent system in the United States. 
 4. Id. at 464; see also Bayhing for Blood or Doling Out Cash?, Economist.com, available at 
http://www.economist.com/science/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=5327661 (discussing the pros, 
cons, and the recent “backlash” against the patenting of technologies by universities). 
 5. Rochelle Dreyfuss, Biotechnology Patents Get Special Treatment: Protecting the Public 
Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 457, 465 
(Fall 2004). 
 6. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005). 
 7. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 STAT. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 
355, 360cc (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2003)). 
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Scalia, the Supreme Court affirmed an expansive definition of § 
271(e)(1) and continued the trend in patent law of extending protection 
from infringement liability in the drug sector as far as prudent. The Court 
missed, however, the opportunity to breathe life into the embattled and, 
arguably, defunct common-law research exemption. 
Part II of this Comment will briefly trace the histories of the 
common-law research exemption and the Hatch-Waxman safe-harbor. 
Part III will outline Integra v. Merck, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC or Federal Circuit) decision that led to Merck. 
Part IV will analyze Merck in detail, emphasizing that decision’s 
beneficial reversal of the CAFC’s restrictive opinion in Integra. Part V 
will then address Merck’s missed opportunity to deal with the common-
law research exemption and the treatment of research tools under § 
271(e)(1), which have the potential to seriously impact the public domain 
in biomedical and pharmaceutical research. Part V advances possible 
solutions and addresses the shortcomings of each. Part VI concludes by 
urging Congress to action. 
 
II.  RESEARCH EXEMPTION AND § 271(E)(1) SAFE-HARBOR 
 
A.  Common-law Research Exemption 
 
Just as reproduction of an expression protected by copyright 
constitutes copyright infringement, use of a patented invention 
constitutes patent infringement.8 Unlike copyright law, however, no 
statutory fair-use exemption exists in patent law.9 Only an embattled 
common-law exemption is available to most accused patent infringers. 
In 1813, Whittemore v. Cutter introduced the first common-law 
exemption to patent infringement.10 In Whittemore, Justice Story stated 
“[i]t could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a 
man, who [without license] constructed such a [patent protected] 
machine merely for philosophical experiments . . . .”11 Several 
subsequent cases mentioned this “research” exemption in dicta but 
generally found it inapplicable to the particular facts.12
The exemption narrowed continually in dicta until 2002 when the 
CAFC, in Madey v. Duke, essentially interred it. In Madey, the Federal 
 8. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2005); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2005). 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2005). 
 10. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.D. Mass. 1813). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Ruth E. Freeburg, Comment, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use: Is it Time for 
Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools?, 53 BUFFALO L. REV. 351, 363-64, n.75 (Winter 2005). 
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Circuit was confronted with Duke University’s use of a patented laser in 
its research laboratories.13 Because use of the laser was “solely for 
research, academic, or experimental purposes,” the District Court agreed 
with Duke’s argument that the laser’s use was covered by the research 
exemption and thus Duke was not liable for infringement.14 On appeal, 
however, the Federal Circuit found this formulation of the exemption to 
be overly broad, noting that only use of patented inventions “for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity or for strictly philosophical inquiry” 
would be protected from liability.15 Backed by an impeccable 
precedential pedigree,16 the court further noted that the experimental use 
exemption17 would not apply if the use of the invention was under the 
“guise of scientific inquiry,” had “definite, cognizable, and not 
insubstantial commercial purposes,”18 or had the “slightest commercial 
implication.”19 Because Duke is in the business of procuring government 
and private research grants, and much of its potential to attract students’ 
tuition payments depends on its research prowess, the court ruled that the 
experimental use exemption was not available to Duke.20 The court 
reasoned that teaching and research constituted two of Duke’s 
“legitimate business objectives,” making use of the laser an inexcusable 
infringement.21
One implication of Madey is that the research exemption will likely 
be deemed unavailable, even to a non-profit research organization whose 
specific research has no immediate commercial implication.22 The logical 
 13. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 
(2003). 
 14. Id. at 1361. 
 15. Id. at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1348 
(Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 16. After Justice Story’s formulation of the exemption, courts uniformly refused to exempt 
anyone from infringement liability, all the while insisting that the existence of the exemption was 
“well settled law.” This reminds the author of his childhood, when his older brother would 
repeatedly insist that performance of some household chore, invariably assigned to the older brother, 
would result in some attractive benefit, only to find the performance technically lacking. See, e.g., 
Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587, 608 (1850); Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1346; Madey, 307 F.3d at 1359-61; 
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wisc. 1999); Poppenhusen 
v. New York Gutta Percha Comb Co., 19 Fed. Cas. 1059, No. 11,283 (C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1858). 
 17. Note that this casenote follows Judge Newman’s convention of using the terms 
“experimental use” and “research” interchangeably. 
 18. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362 (quoting Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc., 733 
F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 19. Embrex, 216 F.3d at 1353 (concurring opinion). 
 20. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
 21. Id. (citing Pitcairn v. United States, 547 F.2d 1106, 1125-26 (Cl. Ct. 1976)). Notice that 
Pitcairn involved tests with aims and implications that would clearly fall under a traditional 
conception of “commercial.” The court truly stretched this concept in finding Duke’s experiments 
“commercial” in Madey. 
 22. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
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result of Madey narrows the research exemption to the point that it has 
little efficacy because it virtually guarantees that courts will be able to 
ferret out some “commercial” application or purpose behind the 
defendant’s use.23 One must pause to wonder where the exemption might 
possibly be found to apply post-Madey. Despite the erosion of this 
common law exemption and recognizing a need for protected use of 
patented products, Congress has provided some statutory relief to 
researchers in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 
B.  Origins of § 271(e)(1) Safe-Harbor 
 
In order to receive regulatory approval to produce and market a 
prescription drug, a manufacturer must file a new drug application 
(NDA) with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) proving that the 
drug is safe and efficacious in the treatment of disease.24 The clinical 
trials involved in amassing this proof are extremely expensive and time-
consuming.25 After the patent protection period on a particular drug 
compound has expired, numerous companies generally enter the market 
and produce what are commonly known as “generic” versions. 
Before 1984, these generic drug manufacturers had to go through the 
same regulatory process their “innovative” predecessor endured in filing 
their NDA. The time spent waiting for the end of the patent period and 
then repeating the approval process for a drug that had already proven 
safe and effective resulted in an extension of the drug’s patent period. 
Generic competitors were prevented from entering the field immediately 
upon expiration of the patent because they had not, and by virtue of the 
patent monopoly, could not, have undertaken the required testing. When 
this distortion was assailed as unfair, innovative drug manufacturers 
countered by pointing to the portion of their patent period lost to the 
same initial regulatory approval process. 
This dispute over distortions in the patent term found expression in 
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co.26 In Roche, the Federal Circuit 
was faced with a generic drug manufacturer that produced samples of a 
patented drug in order to conduct safety and efficacy tests in anticipation 
 23. Id. (stating that “use is disqualified from the defense if it has the ‘slightest commercial 
implication[,]. . . . [is] in keeping with the legitimate business of the alleged infringer[,] . . . [or] is in 
any way commercial in nature.”). The author struggles to conceive of any activities undertaken by 
any entity that would not satisfy these elements. 
 24. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2005). 
 25. Rick Mullin, Drug Development Costs About $1.7 Billion, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING 
NEWS (Dec. 15, 2003), available at http://pubs.acs.org/cen/topstory/8150/8150notw5.html. 
 26. Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co. Inc., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984). 
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of the patent’s expiration. In defense, the generic drug manufacturer, 
Bolar, claimed, inter alia, the experimental use exemption.27 However, 
the court held the experimental use defense inapplicable and ruled that 
any use of a patented drug compound by a generic drug manufacturer 
before the patent’s expiration constituted infringement.28
In response to Roche, Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act of 
1984.29 This act addressed the simultaneous compression and expansion 
of patent terms mentioned above that occurred under the existing FDA 
regime: the running of the patent period during the innovator’s extended 
clinical trials and the de facto extension of the patent period resulting 
from requiring generic manufacturers to redundantly perform these same 
trials. To remedy these inequities, Congress established a new type of 
FDA filing called an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA).30 
Instead of reinventing the pharmaceutical wheel by performing anew the 
same trials done by the innovator, under the ANDA, generic drug 
manufacturers must simply prove that their version of a previously 
approved drug is bioequivalent.31 Since bioequivalence simply means 
that the generic drug works in the same way and has the same effect on 
humans as the innovator, the result is a significantly less expensive and a 
quicker approval process.32 The Act further provided for the extension of 
a drug’s patent term depending on the length of time required for 
regulatory approval of its NDA.33 In addition to simplifying the approval 
process, the Act permitted certain experimental use of patented products 
prior to patent expiration. It provided for pre-expiration use by 
incorporating a new affirmative defense to infringement.34 The relevant 
part of the Act reads: 
 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
 27. Roche, 733 F.2d at 862. It is interesting to note that the severely restrictive view of the 
experimental use exemption that bolstered the CAFC’s decisions in Embrex and Madey has much of 
its roots in Roche. Most troubling is the fact that Roche did not need to so restrict the experimental 
use exemption. Bolar was clearly and admittedly using Roche’s patented compound for a 
commercial purpose. The Madey court, however, cited Roche for the proposition that the non-profit, 
non-commercial nature of the defendant is irrelevant. 
 28. Id. at 863. 
 29. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1993); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282 (2003). 
 30. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2005). 
 31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(B) (2005). 
 32. 21 CFR § 320 (2005) (describing requirements for bioequivalence). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2005). 
 34. Freeburg, supra note 12, at n.92. 
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manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.35
 
This new defense, providing that patented drugs may be lawfully used if 
the use is reasonably related to the submission of information to the 
FDA, has been deemed the Hatch-Waxman or § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.36
 
III.  INTEGRA V. MERCK AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
 
A.  The Safe-Harbor is Quickly Expanded 
 
The impetus behind § 271(e)(1)’s safe-harbor was the frustration of 
generic drug manufacturers and consumers with the lengthy and 
duplicative process of generic drug approval. The United States Supreme 
Court, however, quickly expanded the safe-harbor’s reach to innovative 
medical devices.37 In Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. the applicable 
law was the Federal Drug and Cosmetics Act (the FDCA), a “[f]ederal 
law which regulates . . . drugs”38 and requires submission of information 
for the approval of medical devices. Demonstrating his penchant for 
close statutory reading, Justice Scalia held that the structure of the Hatch-
Waxman Act as a whole indicated that it must have been intended to 
include medical device use in the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.39 Thus, the 
Court held that the language of § 271(e)(1) covered non-patent holders’ 
use of patented inventions as long as the use is related to submission of 
information required under Federal law.40
 
B.   Integra v. Merck Halts the Expansion 
 
Despite its liberal reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor in Eli 
Lilly,41 the Federal Circuit reversed course and limited the provision’s 
applicability in Integra.42
 
 
 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2005). 
 36. This Comment will refer to it as the “§ 271(e)(1) safe-harbor.” 
 37. Eli Lilly and Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990), vacated, 915 F.2d 670 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990). 
 38. Eli Lilly. 496 U.S. at 661. 
 39. Id. at 669-70. 
 40. Id. at 672-73. 
 41. Id. at 664. 
 42. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), corrected by 
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (July 10, 2003).
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1.  Facts 
 
Integra v. Merck involved a compound consisting of a three amino 
acids segment of a protein patented by Integra Lifesciences. Called the 
RGD peptide, this compound was known to be involved in process called 
cell adhesion, which had possible applications in wound healing and 
prosthetics. In addition, David Cheresh, a researcher at The Scripps 
Research Institute,43 discovered that the RGD peptide had the ability to 
inhibit angiogenesis, the process by which new blood vessels are formed 
in the body.44
Sensing the importance of Cheresh’s discovery, Merck, a 
pharmaceutical company,45 entered into an agreement with Cheresh and 
Scripps under which Merck would provide funding and RGD peptides to 
Cheresh’s lab.46 Under the agreement, Cheresh was to perform his 
research with the purpose of developing potential drug candidates that 
Merck would then shuttle through the regulatory approval process.47 
Cheresh soon determined that three cyclic versions of the peptide were 
most effective at inhibiting angiogenesis.48 These peptides were then 
further studied by Cheresh’s lab “to evaluate [their] specificity, efficacy, 
and toxicity . . . for various diseases, to explain the mechanism by which 
these drug candidates work, and to determine which candidates were 
effective and safe enough to warrant testing in humans.”49
Upon learning of the Scripps-Merck agreement, Integra50 offered to 
 43. “The Scripps Research Institute, one of the country’s largest, private, non-profit research 
organizations, has always stood at the forefront of basic biomedical science, a vital segment of 
medical research that seeks to comprehend the most fundamental processes of life. In just three 
decades the Institute has established a lengthy track record of major contributions to the betterment 
of health and the human condition.” Taken from Scripps’ website, available at http://www.scripps. 
edu/intro/overview.html. 
 44. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863 (noting that anti-angiogenesis has potential for application in 
treating cancer, rheumatoid arthritis and other debilitating diseases). 
 45. “Merck is a global pharmaceutical and chemical company with sales of EUR 5.9 billion 
in 2004, a history that began in 1668, and a future shaped by 28,900 employees in 54 countries . . . . 
Merck’s operating activities come under the umbrella of Merck KGaA, in which the Merck family 
holds a 73% interest and free shareholders own the remaining 27%. The former U.S. subsidiary, 
Merck & Co., has been completely independent of the Merck Group since 1917.” Taken from Merck 
KGaA’s website, available at http://www.merck.de/servlet/PB/menu/1007020/index.html. 
 46. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. These tests included assays to determine the action of the cyclic RGD peptides, 
including, inter alia, toxicology, half-life in the bloodstream, and the optimum mode of 
administration. Id. 
 50. “Integra LifeSciences Holdings Corporation is a diversified medical technology company 
that develops, manufactures, and markets medical devices for use in a variety of applications. The 
primary applications for our products are neuro-trauma and neurosurgery, reconstructive surgery, 
general surgery, and soft tissue repair. However, our surgical instrument product lines are used in 
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license use of the peptides to Cheresh. However, negotiations failed and 
Integra filed a patent infringement suit against Scripps, Dr. Cheresh, and 
Merck. The United States District Court for the Southern District of 
California dismissed the suit against Scripps and Cheresh but ruled that 
Merck had infringed Integra’s patents in part because § 271(e)(1) did not 
immunize Merck from liability.51
 
2.  Federal Circuit majority decision 
 
In his opinion for the court, Judge Rader found support for his 
restrictive reading of the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor by focusing on the 
Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history.52
According to the court, by limiting the safe-harbor to “solely . . . uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of information,” 
Congress intended that the exemption be narrowly construed.53 
Specifically, the “reasonably related” test focuses the analysis on the 
information that is to be submitted to the FDA.54 Although some 
experiments that do not directly produce information to the FDA might 
be allowed, the term “solely” requires that these activities be closely 
scrutinized by the court.55 Thus, the court held that Merck’s activities did 
not meet the “reasonably related” test.56 Merck’s experiments constituted 
general biomedical research and were aimed at identifying new 
pharmaceutical compounds.57 Since “the FDA has no interest in the hunt 
for drugs,” the experiments were not reasonably related to the 
submission of information to the FDA and thus were not exempted from 
infringement liability.58
As mentioned above, Judge Rader’s decision was influenced by the 
virtually all surgical disciplines. . .” Taken from Integra’s website, available at http://www.integra-
ls.com/corporate_info/profile.asp. 
 51. Integra had changed the nature of its action against Cheresh and Scripps from one 
seeking damages for infringement to one for declaratory judgment, which would be somewhat akin 
to an order simply enjoining them from further infringement. This declaratory judgment action was 
dismissed on motion by Cheresh and Scripps. Integra, 331 F.3d at 863. Note that the District Court 
found that Scripps’ pre-1995 activities were exempt from infringement liability under the common-
law research exemption. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005). 
Because, however, the issue was not appealed to the CAFC or the United States Supreme Court, no 
decision on the applicability of the exemption was made by these higher courts. Integra, 331 F.3d at 
863, n.2; see discussion, infra Part V. 
 52. Integra, 331 F.3d at 866-67. 
 53. Id. at 866. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 865-66. 
 56. Id. at 866-67. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 866. 
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Hatch-Waxman Act’s legislative history.59 For instance, Judge Rader 
noted that § 271(e)(1) was passed essentially in response to Roche.60 He 
found especially important legislative comments indicating that the 
exemption was initially drafted to apply to “a limited amount of testing 
so that generic manufacturers can establish the bioequivalency of a 
generic substitute.”61 Although, the court was precluded by Eli Lilly from 
holding that § 271(e)(1) applied exclusively to generic drug testing, 
based on the legislative history, it adopted a narrow reading of the 
exemption.62
The court’s opinion ranged from the somewhat contradictory to the 
genuinely thought-provoking. For instance, Judge Rader applied a 
restricted § 271(e)(1) in determining that Merck’s activities were “far 
beyond those necessary to acquire information for FDA approval of a 
patented pioneer drug already on the market.”63 The court justified its 
holding by appealing to the rubric of generic drugs while claiming that § 
271(e)(1)’s reach was not so limited. It then stated the obvious, that § 
271(e)(1) did not apply to all experimental activity that at some point, 
“however attenuated,” may lead to an FDA submission as a straw-man 
argument it quickly blew down.64 On the other hand, the court was well 
founded in its concern over the possible future of biotech research tool 
patents under any other interpretation of § 271(e)(1). Specifically, Judge 
Rader worried that extending the safe-harbor to the Scripps-Merck 
activities would “effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees 
owning biotechnology tool patents.”65
 
3.  Judge Newman’s dissent 
 
Judge Newman penned a vigorous dissent in Integra v. Merck in 
which she challenged the majority’s inattention to the common-law 
experimental use exception and its limiting treatment of the § 271(e)(1) 
 59. See supra Part II. 
 60. Integra, 331 F.3d at 865; see also supra, n.29 and accompanying text. 
 61. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 8 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, at 
2692). 
 62. Id. at 867 (citing Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. 661). It is interesting that the court’s original opinion 
in Integra was amended. The errata decision, reported at 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, softened the 
restrictive wording of the opinion near the beginning of page *17, so as to bring it in line with Eli 
Lilly (i.e. the original Integra opinion was much more explicit in its limitation of the § 271(e)(1) 
safe-harbor to generic drugs). 
 63. Id. “[D]rug already on the market” being an obvious reference to the testing involved in 
the development of generic drugs. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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safe-harbor.66
Newman essentially argued that the experimental use exception 
should extend to any testing performed on the patented invention itself, 
regardless of the possible downstream commercial applications. While 
not even mentioned by the majority, she distinguished between using a 
patented invention to perform tests or experiments and testing or 
experimenting on the patented invention itself.67 She identified 
acceptable purposes for experimenting on a patented invention as 
including “understand[ing] it, or to improve upon it, or to find a new use 
for it, or to modify or ‘design around’ it.”68 Furthermore, she emphasized 
that experimentation with an obvious commercial intent should not 
remove the activities from the common-law research exemption so long 
as the tests were aimed at understanding, improving, or modifying the 
patented invention.69 This distinction is important because it ameliorates 
the majority’s concern that an expansive safe-harbor would vitiate the 
value of research tool patents.70 Therefore, under Judge Newman’s 
analysis, since Cheresh’s experiments focused on studying the properties 
of the cyclic RGD peptides themselves rather than using the peptides to 
test other compounds,71 they qualified for the infringement exception.72
Judge Newman also identifies logical fallacies in the majority 
decision and answers the majority’s public policy concerns. First, 
Newman exposes a logical inconsistency created by the majority 
opinion: extremely early stage research conducted by a qualified 
institution would be exempt from liability under the experimental use 
exception, late stage research that creates information that is submitted to 
the FDA is exempted under § 271(e)(1), and the intervening research 
period is a “strange . . . kind of limbo” in which infringing activities are 
not shielded from liability.73 Second, she argues that recognition of an 
 66. Note that the author has adopted Judge Newman’s convention of equating the common-
law research exemption and the experimental use exception. These two terms are synonymous 
because Judge Newman sees the exemption as reaching use (generally in the form of experimental 
research) that is aimed at understanding, modifying, or improving a patented invention itself. See 
supra note 49. 
 67. Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). This distinction is cited by 
Newman to respond to the majority’s worries about the “vitiat[ion]” of all biotech research tools. 
 68. Id. at 875 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 69. Id. at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 70. Though Newman was specifically discussing the research exemption and not the § 
271(e)(1) safe-harbor, Newman sees the two constructs as intertwined and complementary. 
 71. Note that several of the Scripps-Merck experiments did appear to in fact use the RGD 
peptides as positive controls in testing the anti-angiogenesis properties of other drug candidates. 
Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2378-79 (2005). The implications of 
this bewilderingly unnoticed fact will be discussed in PART V. 
 72. Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 73. Id. at 877. 
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experimental use exemption ought not and need not be a free-for-all that 
eviscerates the rights of patent-holders because testing using the 
invention rather than testing on the invention would still be an 
infringement; attention must be paid “[to] the mechanisms of the 
creation, development, and use of technical knowledge, and [to] today’s 
complexity of interactions among invention and the innovating fruits of 
invention.”74
With regards to the specific facts of Integra, Newman argues that 
incorporation of the experimental use exception in conjunction with § 
271(e)(1) avoids the majority’s conundrum by providing more 
continuous exemption coverage.75 As noted above, the majority’s strict 
understandings of both the experimental use exemption and the § 
271(e)(1) safe-harbor create a limbo-like no-man’s land in which Merck 
inexcusably infringed Integra’s patents.76 While § 271(e)(1) admittedly 
should not “reach back down the chain of experimentation to embrace 
[the] development and identification of new drugs,” the experimental use 
exemption should be co-extensive with § 271(e)(1) such that the latter 
essentially picks up where the former left off.77
 
IV.  MERCK V. INTEGRA AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
 
A.  Opinion and Analysis 
 
Much ink was spilled in the pages of law reviews in response to the 
Federal Circuit’s Integra decision.78 On appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court, Merck elicited amicus briefs from far-ranging friends of 
the court, including major players in the biotech, pharmaceutical, and 
research tool industries.79 The stakes for the entire biotech and drug 
development industries could not have been higher. 
With his signature emphasis on statutory language, Justice Antonin 
Scalia delivered the unanimous opinion for the Court.80 Scalia stated that 
 74. Id. at 876. See also Dreyfuss, supra note 1 (discussion of unique issues in biomedical 
research that support a more vigorous experimental use exemption). 
 75. Further supporting exemption from liability is the fact that Integra’s predecessor, Telios, 
had been unsuccessful in finding a useful application for the RGD peptides. Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 
(Newman, J., dissenting). Some recent proposals for patent reform have centered on forcing patent 
holders to develop the technology in their patents. 
 76. Id. at 876. 
 77. Id. at 877. 
 78. See, e.g., Freeburg, supra note 12; Dreyfuss, supra note 1. 
 79. Including Genentech, Biogen IDEC, Eli Lilly, Wyeth, Pfizer in support of Merck and 
Affymetrix, Vaccinex, and several research universities in support of Integra. 
 80. This author trusts that the reader is aware of the rarity of a unanimous decision from 
today’s Court, let alone one written by arguably the Court’s most polarizing member. Furthermore, 
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the text of the statute indicated that it extended to “all uses of patented 
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and submission 
of any information under the FDCA.”81 Most significant in Scalia’s 
paraphrase is his use of “all” and “any”;82 apparently the Court intended 
to interpret the statute very broadly. Thus, unlike in the District Court 
and the Federal Circuit, the phase of research from which the information 
is garnered is not important to the Court. In fact, the Court stated that 
even preclinical studies are within the scope of the safe-harbor.83
Under Scalia’s formulation of the rule, the key inquiry is identifying 
what information the FDA might be interested in receiving in regards to 
a drug candidate.84 Previously, lower courts struggled with defining 
which information the FDA would be interested in, with one court even 
taking the unique course of deferring to the FDA in deciding if a 
particular defendant’s activities were “reasonably related.”85 Respondent 
Integra attempted a definition that experimentation into a drug 
candidate’s “efficacy, mechanism of action, pharmacokinetics and 
pharmacology are not reasonably included in an [investigational new 
drug application] (IND) or an NDA, and are therefore outside the scope 
of the exemption.”86 In addressing this definition, the Supreme Court 
quickly and simply dispatched it by pointing out that the FDA requires 
that IND’s contain summaries of at least some of those factors which 
were deemed unimportant by Integra.87 As the FDA is charged with 
deciding whether clinical trials of an investigational drug would pose an 
unreasonable risk, a drug developer would be shielded from infringement 
liability for acts giving rise to any information relied upon by the FDA in 
making this risk determination.88
Scalia then proceeded to evaluate the two-part rationale the Federal 
Circuit used to support its definition of the safe-harbor rule. In the first 
part of its rationale, the lower court noted that the FDA does not have 
the brevity of the decision belies its significance. 
 81. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2380 (2005). 
 82. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383 (2005) (§ 271(e)(1) exempts “from infringement all uses of 
patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to the process of developing information for submission 
under any federal law regulating the manufacture, use, or distribution of drugs”) (emphasis in 
original). 
 83. Id. at 2380 (2005). 
 84. Id. at 2382. 
 85. Nexell Therapeutics Inc. v. Amcell Corp., 143 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Del. 2001). The FDA 
declined to decide the case, and the judge held that activities related to clinical trials were not 
infringing. 
 86. Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2381. 
 87. Id. (citing FDA regulations at 21 CFR §§ 312.22(a), (a)(5) (2005)). 
 88. Id. at 2381 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)(3)(B)(i); 21 CFR § 312.23(a)(8) (2005) (requiring 
applicants to include pharmacological and toxicological studies that serve as the basis of their 
conclusion that clinical testing would be “reasonably safe”)). 
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any interest in the hunt for drugs; especially damning was the fact that 
the experiments performed by Cheresh did not yield any information 
which was actually submitted to the FDA.89 Scalia perceived this to be a 
de facto restriction of the application of the safe-harbor rule to only 
generic drugs.90 Furthermore, he reasoned that the Federal Circuit’s 
rationale ignores the realities of drug development, where even late stage 
drug trials are often abandoned and result in no submission to the FDA.91
In contrast, by adding the words “all” and “any” to the statute, 
Congress permitted the safe-harbor rule to do what it was designed to do 
– protect a drug maker that “. . . has a reasonable basis for believing that 
a particular patented compound may work, through a particular 
biological process, to produce a particular physiological effect, and uses 
the compound in research that, if successful, would be appropriate to 
include in a submission to the FDA.”92 However, this more expansive 
reading of the rule is not all-encompassing. Instead, this language limits 
the extent of the safe-harbor, suggesting that some knowledge of the 
drug’s mechanism of action and physiological effect is required before 
the infringing activities may be exempted. 
The Court addressed the Federal Circuit’s second rationale by 
essentially agreeing that the safe-harbor does not embrace all activities 
that may at some “attenuated” point lead to an FDA submission.93 The 
Court declared that research conducted with the reasonable belief that the 
drug will have a desired effect is reasonably related to the submission of 
information to the FDA.94
 
B.  Balancing Protection with Purpose 
 
The importance of the freedom granted to research institutions and 
drug companies by the Court’s holding cannot be overstated. The Federal 
Circuit had in essence restricted the extent of the safe-harbor to generic 
drug development.95 Although under Eli Lilly, the decision could not 
explicitly provide such a restriction, it did in effect do so by indicating 
that only those activities that were certain to produce information 
 89. Id. at 2382 (quoting Integra, 331 F.3d at 865). 
 90. Id. at 2383. Only in the realm of generic drugs could an experimenter have sufficiently 
sure knowledge that a particular experiment would actually result in submission of information to 
the FDA. Id.; see supra notes 62 and 63. 
 91. Id. at 2383 (noting that the Federal Circuit’s construction of § 271(e)(1) renders the 
exemption “illusory”). 
 92. Id. at 2382. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 2383. 
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submitted to the FDA would be exempted from liability.96 The Court 
correctly recognized that this take on the statute does not resonate with 
the hit-and-miss nature of drug development.97
The importance of the Court’s decision is not likely to be lost on 
commentators, if their uproarious reaction to Integra is any indication.98 
Rochelle Dreyfus points out that Madey effectively destroyed the 
common law research exemption and that Integra limited the § 271(e)(1) 
to generic drug development.99 In contrast, after Merck, drug developers 
are now much more free to test patented compounds and their derivatives 
for potential pharmaceutical benefits. As an example, consider the fact 
that drug companies have libraries compiled of thousands of chemical 
compounds, many of which are “scaffold” compounds to which different 
side chains and active groups may be added to achieve a certain 
physiological effect.100 Under Integra, unauthorized use of such a 
compound in experiments to test the compound’s safety and efficacy 
would constitute an infringement unless the experiments involved 
 96. Id. 
 97. Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2382-83 (noting that even late-stage clinical testing is not eventually 
submitted to FDA since late-stage drug candidates can prove unworthy of submission for FDA 
approval). 
 98. Dreyfuss, supra note 1; Freeburg, supra note 12. See generally Note, Integra v. Merck: 
Limiting the Scope of the 271(e)(1) Exception to Patent Infringement, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193 
(2004); Angela M. Davison, Shrinking Waters in the Safe Harbor: Has Integra Lifesciences v. 
Merck Turned the Tide by Narrowing Available Exempted Infringing Uses?, 59 FOOD DRUG L.J. 79 
(2004). 
 99. Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 461. 
 100. For instance, “steroid” refers to a broad class of chemical compounds often involved in 
intercellular signaling. A steroid consists of a core component, or moiety, made up of several carbon 
rings (the hexagons and pentagon in the diagram below). A long carbon “tail” (the zig-zag extending 
up and to the left) has been added to the steroid “scaffold” to form cholesterol. This example begins 
to give the reader an idea of the nearly infinite range of compounds that pharmaceutical companies 
must screen in order to find a suitable drug candidate. The reader will also begin to see the 
stranglehold a company would have if it owned a patent on the steroid core and other companies 
could not even use the steroid to develop additions and modifications. 
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humans.101 The Supreme Court, recognizing the vital role drug 
companies play in the health of society, ruled that uses similar to the 
imaginary modified scaffold above are shielded from liability so long as 
the experimenter reasonably believes that the experiments will lead to 
information that could ultimately be submitted to the FDA.102
Perhaps most importantly, the Court appears to have reaffirmed the 
fundamental purpose behind the patent system: scientific and 
technological advancement with the understanding that such will 
improve people’s lives.103 Thus, although intellectual property protection 
is the stated goal of patent protection, the underlying policy of patent 
protection is improvement of the human condition. Accordingly, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act modified patent protection in order to provide a 
means for faster development and delivery to the public of affordable 
generic drugs by carving out a limitation of the patent holder’s rights 
(which had been artificially created by the patent law in the first 
place).104 Likewise, while the first patent office administrator, Thomas 
Jefferson, and others have recognized the importance of patent protection 
to the advancement of science, this recognition has always been 
tempered by a visceral suspicion of monopolies.105 When a patent has an 
overwhelming effect of stifling innovation, it has outgrown the 
justification for its existence and should be reined in. The Court in Merck 
saw § 271(e)(1) as guarding against this: giving drug companies more 
room in which to work and advance knowledge in medicine, the most 
vital of areas. 
 
V.  MERCK’S MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 
 
While Merck did much to correct a worrisome trend in the Federal 
Circuit, neither the common law research exemption nor the applicability 
of § 271(e)(1) to research tools were dealt with adequately, either 
because the parties did not litigate these issues or because the Court’s 
       101.  Generally speaking, mere addition of elements to a patented invention does not evade 
infringement. Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Intern., Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 
1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
         102.  Recall that there appears to be the added requirement that the researcher have some idea 
of the physiological effect of the drug. See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2383. 
 103.   The “embarrassment” of a patent monopoly is tolerated only to the extent it spurs 
innovation. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (quoting Thomas Jefferson, first 
administrator of the patent system in the United States). See infra Part V for more discussion of this 
compromise and why the courts must always be mindful of the basis of patent law. 
 104.   Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003); corrected 
by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796, *11 (July 10, 2003) (quoting Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 
F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 105.   Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9. 
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unusually taciturn opinion simply did not address them. 
 
A.  Common Law Research Exemption 
 
As Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent, Integra v. Merck 
offered an excellent opportunity to reinvigorate the common law 
research exemption.106 Unfortunately, the Court missed this opportunity. 
For example, the Merck-Scripps collaboration aimed initially at 
synthesizing and studying the RGD peptide and derivatives in the hopes 
of understanding the full extent of their biological properties. Under the 
Court’s decision, unless the researchers had “a reasonable belief that the 
compound [would] cause the sort of physiological effect [they intended] 
to induce,” any tests conducted would not have been covered by the safe-
harbor rule.107 In contrast, under Judge Newman’s formulation of the 
experimental use exemption, such activities would have been shielded 
from liability regardless of any FDA submission.108
The most important consequence of a resurrected experimental use 
would be the added freedom inventors would have to advance 
technology beyond its current state, as represented by the patented 
invention. An inventor’s ability to “design around” and/or improve upon 
the patented invention is seriously limited if his access to the invention is 
restricted to his ability to obtain a license. 
In addition, a meaningful common law exemption accommodates 
intellectual property protection, while at the same time balancing it with 
the unique aspects of biotechnology.109 Indeed, the experimental use 
exemption was acceptable in its exceedingly narrow form because, 
before biotech, there existed a clear conceptual and legal division 
between fundamental science and its application in end-products. 
Fundamental discoveries—such as the scaffold compounds mentioned in 
the above example—were not patentable and only the downstream 
applications of these discoveries would be granted a patent that was 
limited in scope to reach only other end-products.110 In biotechnology, by 
contrast, frontier discoveries often have immediate applications and are 
granted broad upstream patents that severely hamper the activities of 
subsequent researchers.111 This has been described as the problem of the 
 106.   Integra, 331 F.3d at 874 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 107.   Merck, 125 S.Ct. at 2383. 
 108.   Integra, 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 109.   Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 463 (noting that the “fruits of biotechnology,” unlike in many 
other areas of science and technology, often have immediate commercial applications). 
 110.   See, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966); see also, In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 
1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 111.   Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1372. 
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anticommons and recognition of its severity has been increasing.112 If 
access to fundamental scientific discoveries—such as antibodies against 
a certain cell-receptor or the purified form of a gene known to exist in 
people particularly susceptible to breast cancer113—is limited by broad 
patents and the abolition of the experimental use exception, innovation 
will be asphyxiated. 
Admittedly, the Federal Circuit’s and the Supreme Court’s refusal to 
address this issue is technically well-founded as the parties did not raise 
it on appeal.114 The Supreme Court, at least, has shown itself amenable to 
deciding issues not raised at trial or on appeal but whose policy 
implications beg for resolution.115 Further, Judge Newman’s impassioned 
plea for the resurrection of the experimental use exception and both 
courts’ proclivity for deciding or at least discussing collateral issues give 
one pause when considering what might have been had the Court taken 
the liberty to address this issue. 
 
B.  Research Tools 
 
Perhaps the most important issue in Merck was the application of § 
271(e)(1) and to a lesser extent the common-law research exemption to 
patented research tools. Yet, discussion of protection of research tools 
was largely ignored because the Court erroneously deemed it not to be 
found in the record.116
 
1.  Misreading the record 
 
In one seemingly innocuous sentence in his recitation of Merck’s 
 112.   Freeburg, supra note 12, at 399 (discussing Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, Science 698 (1998)). The 
problem of the commons was described as the inefficient use of a resource due to its being owned by 
all of society “in common.” The problem of the anticommons, in contrast, exists when too many 
parties hold exclusive rights and the elbow room required to advance science is lacking. 
 113.   Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 459-60 (discussing example of patenting of the BrcA1 gene). 
 114.   Integra, 331 F.3d at 863, note 2. 
 115.   For a recent, controversial example of the Supreme Court looking into a question not 
raised or preserved at trial, briefed on appeal to the Federal Circuit, or mentioned in the request for 
certiorari, see LabCorp v. Metabolite, U.S. Supreme Court Docket No. 04-607, available at 
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/04-607.htm (asking the Solicitor General to brief the Court 
on the patentability of the claims at issue in view of Diamond v. Diehr’s ruling that “one cannot 
patent ‘laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.’”). This question was not broached by 
either party at trial nor in the lower courts, but the Court in its discretion has at least expressed 
interest in deciding it. See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Intellectual Property Law Association 
in Support of Respondent at 3-4, n.5, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc., 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 04-607). 
 116.   Infra, note 119. 
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facts, Justice Scalia stated that “Scripps used the RGD peptide in . . . tests 
as ‘positive controls’ against which to measure the efficacy of the 
mimetics.”117 To the casual reader this may seem unimportant, but it 
represents one of the key facts of the case. Scripps not only studied the 
RGD peptides themselves for their efficacy, safety and mode of action, 
but used them as a tool against which to compare the efficacy of other 
compounds. This use, since it is not experimentation on the patented 
invention itself but use of the invention in conducting research on 
another compound, is exactly the type of use that should not fall behind 
the shield of Judge Newman’s reinvigorated experimental use 
exception.118 Likewise, those in the pharmaceutical and biotech 
industries recognize this sort of use as that of a research tool.119
Merck could be read to exempt, under § 271(e)(1), the use of a 
patented compound as a research tool to study another compound that is 
a drug candidate, but this reading would probably be an impermissible 
stretch.120 Trying to assuage the Federal Circuit’s fears that patents on 
research tools would be effectively eviscerated if activities such as 
Merck’s were exempted from infringement liability, the Court expressly 
stated that its holding did not apply to research tools.121 It is not clear 
whether the Court refused to decide the question because it was not 
argued—which would be an acceptable reason for omitting such a vital 
issue—or because the record did not include use of research tools—
which would be erroneous. The applicability of § 271(e)(1) to research 
tools was left open by the Court to be decided another day. But, as will 
be shown below, this was arguably the most important aspect of the 
case!122
 117.   Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372, 2379 (2005) (emphasis 
added). 
 118  . Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). Note that Judge Newman, unlike 
the Integra majority, joined and the Supreme Court in misreading the record as containing no use of 
the peptides as research tools. Id. 
 119.   Brief for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 18-20, 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1237); see also 
Integra, 331 F.3d at 872, n.4. 
 120.   The author admits, however, that there is language in Merck that could allow such a 
reading. See Merck, 125 S. Ct. at 2382. 
 121.   Merck, 125 S. Ct. at note 7 (stating that it was “apparent from the record” that the RGD 
peptides were not used as research tools). 
 122.   As Judge Newman pointed out in her dissent, the Federal Circuit essentially 
acknowledged that Scripps used the peptides as a research tool and proceeded to decide that this use 
did not fall within the § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor. Integra, 331 F.3d at 877-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
The Supreme Court should have treated research tools in its decision, even though this point was not 
appealed, because a reversal of the Federal Circuit’s decision could be interpreted to mean that § 
271(e)(1) does apply to research tools regardless of the Court’s attempts to limit its holding. Brief 
for Invitrogen Corp. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 19-20, Integra Lifesciences I, 
Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (No. 03-1237). 
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2.  Why unique biotech issues require both the common law exemption 
and a vigorous § 271(e)(1) safe-harbor 
 
Biotechnology and biomedical research depend largely upon the use 
of patented compositions of matter for their advancement. Antibodies, 
purified DNA sequences, cell surface receptors and other biological 
products are essential components to any research project. However, 
broad patents have been granted on such “tools,” making even 
fundamental biomedical research an expensive or, in cases where the 
patent holder belligerently refuses to license, an impossible endeavor. As 
Rochelle Dreyfuss has noted, biotech has changed the former paradigm 
that consisted of linear advancement from unpatentable fundamental 
research and discovery to patentable consumer end-products.123
It is a core tenet of patent law that products, laws, and phenomena of 
nature are not patentable.124 An obvious reason for this is that the 
inventor has arguably not invented anything when he discovers a law or 
product of nature and thus deserves no patent rights.125 Perhaps the 
firmest basis for this universal bar on the patentability of products of 
nature, though, is that these things form the foundation for further 
research,126 and allowing their patenting would stifle development of 
applications that might stem from them. In the arena of biomedical 
research and biotechnology, however, elements that skirt the line 
between products of nature and products of man, such as an isolated 
human gene or an antibody to a particular antigen, are patentable. In the 
exemplary case of a patented gene, patentability may be defensible based 
on the presence of direct, immediate commercial applications, such as 
using the gene as a tool to diagnose certain diseases or predispositions. In 
other words, in biotech the line between a fundamental law or product of 
nature and an application of the law or end-product is blurred. 
This quandary may be resolved by holding fast to the basic principles 
of the American patent system. Monopolistic patent rights are not 
awarded based on some Lockean system of reward or desserts.127 Patent 
rights are artificial creations of the patent law granted by legislative 
 123.   Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 463. 
 124.   Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 312 (1980). 
 125.   Under this Lockean analysis, patents are awarded based on the rights or desserts of the 
inventor –  i.e. the inventor has mixed his labor with the raw materials in order to create a new 
invention that has, in turn, become his. It is important to note, however, that even this philosophical 
view of patents is not the one embraced by the United States. Robert P. Merges, et al., Intellectual 
Property in the New Technological Age 119 (3rd ed., Aspen Publishers 2003). 
 126.   Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1980); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
 127.   See supra note 103. 
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grace “to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”128 The 
ultimate value129 in the isolation of a gene associated with a particular 
disorder is its potential for leading to a cure, not simply identifying the 
people who have the disorder. This is where science and the useful arts 
are truly advanced. Researchers, especially those at universities and other 
non-profit research institutions (such as Scripps), should have free access 
to such genes in order to determine what the particular gene product is 
and how either blocking or enhancing its action would treat the 
disorder.130 Further advancement is restrained, however, if the owner of 
the gene patent refuses to license or charges stiff fees.131 In trying to 
secure patent holders’ rights, the founders, and Thomas Jefferson in 
particular,132 did not intend such a disastrous suffocation of innovation.133
 
VI.  POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
 
At its heart, this Comment is not about an obscure problem in drug 
patent law. While it is true that the implications of Merck’s omissions 
reach primarily into the realm of biomedical research and drug 
development, these fields in turn implicate health care, drug prices, and 
other hot button issues that are continually on the legislative agenda and 
seem to play a part in every presidential election. 
 
A.  Revitalization of Common Law Research Exemption 
 
Judge Newman’s dissent suggested the resurrection of the 
experimental use exception in order to solve the anticommons problem 
of squelching downstream innovation by broad upstream patents.134 
Certainly, this is long overdue. Madey arguably misconstrued the nature 
of university and non-profit research. Judge Newman’s formulation of 
the research exemption, which focuses more on the nature of the use than 
 128.   U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 129.   “Value” here refers to the societal value rather than the monetary value underlying the 
patent. 
 130.   This activity would likely be included under the experimental use exception formulated 
by Judge Newman since the researchers are largely studying the invention itself (the touchstone of 
Judge Newman’s proposed experimental use analysis). Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J., 
dissenting). 
 131.   Example of BrcA1 gene in Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 459-60. 
 132.   VI Writings of Thomas Jefferson 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed.) (as cited approvingly in 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966)). 
 133.   See, e.g., Report of the National Institutes of Health Working Group on Research Tools 
App. D, available at http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/appendd.htm (June 4, 1998). 
 134.   Integra, 331 F.3d at 875-76 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Freeburg, supra note 12, 
at 399. 
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the possibility of commercial applications, would do much to help return 
fundamental research to its previously free and open state.135
Merck, as noted above, will serve to lessen the impact of the death of 
the research exemption by expanding the applicability of § 271(e)(1). 
Within the limited field of research that might reasonably lead to 
submission of information to the FDA, Merck prevented the likely 
chilling effects that Integra could have had. But Merck failed to look at 
the question of whether § 271(e)(1) and the common law research 
exemption apply to research tools—a question with implications far 
beyond the preparation of drug candidates for regulatory approval. 
While Judge Newman wisely suggested the revitalization of a 
judicial doctrine that has all but fallen by the wayside, she did not go far 
enough.136 Judge Newman’s common law exemption fails to solve the 
problem of a rapidly shrinking public domain in scientific research 
because unauthorized use of research tools is still prohibited, even if that 
use is by universities or other institutions to which the common law 
exemption should presumptively apply. 
 
B.  Mandatory Waivers of Future Patent Rights by Researchers 
 
Rochelle Dreyfuss suggests an intriguing solution to the problem: a 
modified research exemption in which universities and research 
institutions may use a patented invention—either to study it or to use it 
as a research tool—without a license only if they agree in an explicitly 
binding waiver not to pursue patent protection for any invention that may 
derive from such use.137
This limited common law exemption rubric is problematic in that it 
takes away universities’ economic incentive (a patented product) for 
investing large amounts of money in using the research tools to develop 
applications. In other words, would anyone ever sign such a waiver of 
patent rights?138 Even still, Dreyfus’ suggestion is worth deeper 
legislative consideration. 
 
C.  Judicial Activism 
 
One conceivable avenue for enhancing the public domain in biotech 
 135.   See Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 462-64 for a discussion of the previously vast public 
sphere in which fundamental research operated, where basic research discoveries were freely shared 
amongst universities. See also Introduction, supra. 
 136.   Integra, 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 137.   Dreyfuss, supra note 1, at 471. 
 138.   See id. at 472. 
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research would be to simply call on the courts to construe the utility 
requirement of patent law narrowly such that patenting of compositions 
of matter as research tools is not allowed.139 There is some promise in 
this given a recent Federal Circuit decision in which a DNA patent was 
invalidated based in part on the PTO’s determination that the patentee 
was attempting to claim “starting points for further research, not the end-
point of any research effort.”140 Further, using a chemical compound in a 
research setting is arguably not a “use” within the meaning of § 271 
because the invention’s true utility is in its use as a drug, reagent, etc.141 
Another route, suggested by Judge Rader, is simply to allow the courts to 
apply damages in such a way as to give the common law research 
exemption bite.142
Courts have been exceedingly resistant, however, to read any 
additional limitations into the patent laws, especially regarding utility.143 
In response to arguments about the stifling of innovation similar to those 
put forth in this article, the Federal Circuit in the case of In re Fisher has 
already stated that it will not weigh such policy issues since they are 
“more appropriately directed to Congress.”144 Judge Rader’s dissent in 
Fisher further indicates that research tools would probably be deemed to 
have a utility under § 101.145 Thus any narrow construction of the “use” 
of patented inventions must be statutorily mandated, as discussed below. 
 
D.  Legislative Action 
 
In contrast to the above suggestions, the following two-part solution 
requires revision of existing statutory patent law: first, a patent should be 
required to specifically claim the use of the invention as a research tool, 
much as a process patent must be clearly claimed as such; second, 
 139.   In order to receive a patent, an invention must new and useful. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2005). 
This is commonly known as the “utility requirement” and has been a source of vexation for many 
seeking biotechnology patents. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 140.   In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1370. 
 141.   “Reagents” are chemicals that participate in reactions. Often reagents set the stage for and 
assist a particular reaction in taking place, but generally are not the focus. 
 142.   Embrex v. Service Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., 
concurring) (noting that the amounts involved in damage awards are naturally tailored in such a way 
as to make truly experimental uses essentially exempt). 
 143.   See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 308 (1980). 
 144.   Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378. Note, however, the court upheld the PTO’s determination that 
the applicant was trying to claim “starting points for further research” when he pointed out that the 
DNA sequences could be used in several biomedical research applications such as gene expression 
microarrays. 
 145.   Id. at 1379 (Rader, J., dissenting) (stating that research tools have a specific and 
substantial utility, namely performing scientific research). 
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infringing “use” of a patented invention must be limited to using the 
invention in the way specifically claimed. 
The first part of this rule would be accomplished by creating a 
research tool patent category, in addition to the present categories of 
compositions of matter, products by processes, and methods. Once this 
new category has been created, special rules governing research tool 
patents could be created, such as disallowing research tool claims on 
compositions of matter. 
For instance, research tool claims could be granted by the PTO only 
in cases where the invention is an actual machine or implement that has 
utility limited only to use in a research setting—i.e. compositions of 
matter such as the RGD peptide at issue in Merck would not be 
patentable as research tools because they have potential usefulness as 
drugs. In a scenario such as the diagnostic gene “imagined” above,146 the 
extent of patent protection would be limited to the clinical applications 
for which the patent was originally sought, such as diagnosis of diseases. 
Under this new system, the patents at issue in Merck would only have 
been allowed to exclude competitors from using the RGD peptides as 
compositions of matter (i.e. as a pharmaceutical drug). Use of the RGD 
peptides as positive controls in laboratory testing of other compounds 
without a license would be permitted because by statute, the RGD 
peptide could not be claimed as a research tool. Congress could soften 
any harsh effects of this new rubric by allowing the patentee to elect 
either claiming the invention as a research tool or a more general 
composition of matter, rather than requiring wholesale denial of research 
tool claims in the case of compositions of matter. 
In combination with the above suggestion, which would restrict 
which uses may be included in a particular patent, limitations could also 
be placed on which types of use constitute infringement. For instance, 
when a patent specifies the utility of the claimed invention, only uses of 
the invention conforming to this specific utility would be considered 
infringing. There is precedent for limiting the infringement causes of 
action that may be brought under certain types of patents. For example, 
doctors may not, for reasons of pure public policy, be sued for 
infringement of a patent on a surgical procedure.147
This solution is not without its limitations. Congress does not like to 
 146.   Supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 147.   35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(1) (2000). For discussion of proposal for a limitation on 
infringement liability similar to the one exempting physicians, see S. Minwalla, A Modest Proposal 
to Amend the Patent Code 35 U.S.C. § 287(c) to Allow Health Care Providers to Examine their 
Patients’ DNA, 26 Ill. U. L.J. 471-504 (2002) (proposing to expand the provision in the Patent Act 
that protects physicians from infringement actions for performing medical procedures to include 
genetic tests). 
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make drastic changes to the patent law, and creating an additional patent 
category would definitely be drastic. Furthermore, Judge Rader’s 
concern over eviscerating research tool patents still looms and it would 
take deep legislative analysis to tailor the new statutory scheme so as to 
ensure that biotech research tool patents retain some value. But this 
solution promises to be surprisingly elastic and would have much room 
for adjustment and refinement by Congress. For instance, Congress could 
define this suggested new category of patents as broadly or narrowly as it 
deems prudent. Or it could combine solutions by only requiring research 
institutions such as universities to sign Professor Dreyfuss’ waiver when 
they want exempted use of patents that fall into the suggested new 
category. The suggestions above are a good starting point from which 
Congress can plod forward. 
 
E.  Anxiety over Changes is Not Unreasonable, Only Misguided 
 
Courts are reluctant to change their interpretation of the patent law 
and Congress is anxious about making any drastic legislative changes.148 
Judge Rader agonized over the effect an overly broad § 271(e)(1) safe-
harbor would have on the value of research tool patents.149 After all, 
essential to the patent system’s ability to promote the progress of science 
and technology is its ability to incentivize research and development by 
providing for recuperation of costs. Others have wondered whether any 
legislation or court action can realistically put this genie back into its 
bottle.150
Focusing too intensely on the above concerns, however, ignores 
arguably more important and troubling issues in biotech patent law. For 
instance, the loss of the free sharing of knowledge that existed amongst 
universities and between universities and industry has led to a “patent 
thicket,” navigation through which has become prohibitively expensive 
for many universities.151 In essence, broad upstream patents in biotech 
 148.   See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
308 (1980); see also Michael Kanellos, Patent System’s Problems Defy Easy Solutions, CNET (Aug. 
4, 2005), available at http://news.com.com/Invention+intervention—
fixing+the+patent+system/2009-1001_3-5817175.html?tag=nl (noting the complexity of fixing 
patent system by legislation and the competing values and concerns that make it complex). 
 149.   Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867 (Fed. Cir. 2003), 
corrected by 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 27796 (July 10, 2003). 
 150.   Kanellos, supra note 148. 
 151.   Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States 
Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 
56 Baylor L. Rev. 917, 944-45 (2004); see also Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can 
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698 (1998); 
Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent 
Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2001). 
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have created Goldberg-like entitlements in the minds of many biotech 
companies.152 Many firms have forayed into the realm of basic research, 
previously reserved to universities, in the hopes of hitting the next patent 
mother lode. This begs the question of why the research university 
community must suffer because of a calculated maneuver by 
corporations.153
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Action is needed to return the patent law to its roots. Jefferson would 
undoubtedly be embarrassed at how far the patent law has diverged from 
its original basis in promoting scientific advance.154 The insinuation of 
Lockean principles of desserts in patent law has caused anti-competitive 
patents to become the norm in scientific research, rather than pro-
competitive free access. 
Some recent court decisions have slowed the erosion of the scientific 
public domain, but greater action is required. Regardless of which of the 
above solutions is adopted by the courts, Congress must recognize that a 
problem of a shrinking public sphere exists in biomedical research and 
that, due to judicial inertia in the case of Merck or counterproductive 
activism in the case of Integra, only legislative action will provide 
effective and lasting relief. Otherwise, scientific progress may be 
suffocated by the very device created to promote it. 
 
Benjamin G. Jackson*
 
 152.   See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Court held that government 
provision of certain welfare benefits for a period of time created an entitlement to these benefits). 
Many companies have similarly become overly dependent on these upstream patents and thus have 
begun to feel entitled to them almost as of right. Notice that this attitude is fundamentally at odds 
with the patent law’s refusal to base its grant of rights in any kind of desserts owed to the inventor. 
Supra note 103. 
 153. The sophistication of corporations in general and biotech firms in particular, coupled with 
the conscious decision to encroach on research ground previously reserved for non-profits and 
universities, makes the award of Goldberg-like entitlements especially questionable. 
 154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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